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OPINION 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
  Appellant Ronald Salahuddin (“Salahuddin”) 
was the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety in Newark, New 
Jersey.  During his time in public office, he allegedly 
conspired to use his official position to obtain charitable and 
political contributions and to direct Newark demolition 
contracts to Appellant Sonnie Cooper (“Cooper”), with whom 
Salahuddin was allegedly in business.  Salahuddin and 
Cooper were convicted of conspiring to extort under color of 
official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a).   
 Salahuddin and Cooper each raise an array of issues on 
appeal, none of which overlap.  Salahuddin raises issues with 
the jury instructions and the proofs required for conviction 
under the Hobbs Act.  Cooper raises issues with the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict 
and the Government’s alleged selective prosecution and 
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outrageous conduct in its investigation and prosecution.  We 
will affirm both Salahuddin’s and Cooper’s convictions.   
I. 
A. 
 Salahuddin was the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety in 
the City of Newark, New Jersey under the administration of 
then-Mayor Cory Booker.  Cooper owned and operated a 
number of stores and businesses in Newark, including S. 
Cooper Brothers Trucking (“Cooper Brothers”), a demolition 
business.  Cooper Brothers was qualified to receive 
demolition work from Newark under the city’s minority set-
aside policy, but was ineligible for other demolition work.   
 Evidence introduced at trial suggests that Salahuddin 
was a “silent partner” in Cooper’s demolition business.  In 
2004, Salahuddin gave Cooper money and mortgaged his 
home and rental property so that Cooper Brothers could 
pledge sufficient collateral to obtain a performance bond that 
was a prerequisite for a garbage contract in Irvington, New 
Jersey.  Salahuddin also served as a general indemnitor for 
the bond.  These mortgages remained in effect through the 
time frame relevant to the conspiracy.  Salahuddin gave 
money to Cooper for Cooper Brothers-related litigation and 
expenses.  Salahuddin helped Cooper generally in running the 
business and facilitated obtaining an overdue payment from 
the City of Newark soon after becoming Deputy Mayor.  The 
two occasionally referred to one another as business partners.  
Salahuddin did not disclose his financial involvement with 
Cooper Brothers.  Nor did Cooper disclose Salahuddin’s 
involvement on licensing forms filed with the state on behalf 
of Cooper Brothers. 
 In July of 2006, Salahuddin met with Joseph 
Parlavecchio (“Parlavecchio”), a Newark political operative.  
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Parlavecchio served as a consultant for several Newark 
demolition companies.  One of these companies belonged to 
Nicholas Mazzocchi (“Mazzocchi”), a Newark businessman.  
Mazzocchi’s company had retained Parlavecchio as a 
consultant to help obtain demolition work from Newark, 
because despite being the largest demolition contractor in 
New Jersey, Mazzocchi’s company had not obtained 
demolition work from Newark for five years.  Unbeknownst 
to Parlavecchio, Salahuddin, and Cooper, Mazzocchi was 
cooperating with the F.B.I. as an informant.  He had agreed to 
work with the F.B.I. in April of 2006 – before this alleged 
conspiracy began – in order to avoid prosecution for bribery 
and tax-evasion.  He recorded numerous meetings and 
telephone conversations with Salahuddin and Cooper.  These 
recordings were introduced at trial and comprised the bulk of 
the evidence against the two.1 
 Despite the fact that Salahuddin had no official power 
over the awarding of demolition contracts, Salahuddin and 
Parlavecchio discussed dividing the Newark demolition work 
between Mazzocchi, Cooper Brothers, and another demolition 
company for which Parlavecchio worked.  Parlavecchio 
recounted the agreement that he and Salahuddin had 
discussed to Mazzocchi, stating that Mazzocchi could obtain 
demolition work in Newark from Salahuddin if he promised 
to give Cooper some work once in a while.   
 Mazzocchi met with Cooper individually and with 
both Cooper and Salahuddin several times.  They solidified 
their understanding of the plan, whereby Salahuddin would 
use his political influence to steer demolition work to 
                                            
1 Parlavecchio was involved in discussions leading to 
the alleged conspiracy in the beginning, but he was not 
charged as a member of the conspiracy.   
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Mazzocchi, who would then give a piece of that work, or 
subcontract it, to Cooper.  Mazzocchi and Cooper 
acknowledged the need for discretion, because Salahuddin 
was a “political guy.”  SA 172.  Salahuddin confirmed that he 
had the power to steer demolition work, stating:  “I just tell 
people this is what we want and that’s the way, you know, it 
can happen.”  SA 190.  Salahuddin summarized the 
arrangement to Mazzocchi, stating:  “I’ll take care of, you 
know, Newark. . . . You’ll be back in Newark. . . . And then, 
you two, when something comes down the pike, you can 
always call [Cooper] . . . .”  SA 202.  
 To effectuate the conspiracy, Salahuddin urged 
Newark’s Demolition Director Bob Minter – who had 
responsibility for awarding demolition contracts – to give 
work to Mazzocchi.  Salahuddin told Minter that Mazzocchi 
was a “friend of the administration,” and Minter understood 
this to mean that he should give work to Mazzocchi.  JA 
1893-95.   
 Mazzocchi did offer some demolition work to Cooper.  
He paid Cooper for some demolition work done at a small 
carwash.  After this work and payment, Salahuddin told 
Mazzocchi that “we, I appreciate it tremendously.”  SA 217.  
A week after this carwash demolition work, Salahuddin 
agreed to help Mazzocchi collect on a past-due bill with the 
City of Newark, stating that his help was just part of their 
“working relationship.”  SA 224.  Additionally, Minter 
awarded two demolition jobs to Mazzocchi in 2007.  
Mazzocchi subcontracted some of the work on both of these 
jobs to Cooper.  For one of them, Cooper was paid $5,029.  A 
day after depositing the check, Cooper wrote a check to 
Salahuddin for $5,000 from the Cooper Brothers’ account.  
The memo line stated:  “Repay of Cash Loan.”  SA 148. 
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 In addition to work contracted from the City of 
Newark, Salahuddin, Cooper, and Mazzocchi discussed 
prospective demolition work on the new arena for the New 
Jersey Devils hockey team.  Salahuddin proposed that he 
would suggest to the Devils that Mazzocchi receive the 
demolition work.  While Mazzocchi would get the majority of 
it, Mazzocchi would subcontract a significant portion of that 
work to Cooper.  Salahuddin told Mazzocchi that Mazzocchi 
was going to “be the pilot” but “we [he and Cooper] just 
wanna be on the boat.”  SA 240-41.  Salahuddin tried to keep 
the Devils arena work private, rather than having a public bid 
process. 
 Salahuddin also sought and extracted political and 
charitable contributions from Mazzocchi to help him 
influence the demolition contracting process.  He explained to 
Mazzocchi that if Mazzocchi supported these entities, 
Salahuddin could show other officials that Mazzocchi was 
helping the city.  Mazzocchi made several contributions 
during the time frame of the conspiracy.  He spent $5,000 on 
a donation to Newark Now – a nonprofit associated with 
Mayor Booker, $3,000 to purchase a table at a fundraiser for 
Mayor Booker, $1,000 for a golf outing for Empower Newark 
– a political action committee, and a total of $3,000 on 
donations to Empower Newark.  Salahuddin advised that 
Mazzocchi should conceal the source of some of his 
contributions by having the check come from a secretary or a 
family member. 
B. 
 On February 18, 2010, a grand jury in Trenton, New 
Jersey returned a five-count indictment against Salahuddin 
and Cooper.  In Count 1, both were charged with conspiracy 
to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion under color of 
 8 
official right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a).  In Count 2, both were charged with attempt to 
obstruct interstate commerce by extortion under color of 
official right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2.  In Counts 3, 4 and 5, they were 
charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(B) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2 for knowingly and corruptly soliciting, demanding, 
accepting and agreeing to accept as bribes things of value to 
influence and reward Salahuddin’s effort to steer Newark 
demolition contracts to Mazzocchi and Cooper.  Count 3 
related to contracts that Cooper received.  Count 4 charged 
only Salahuddin for contributions Mazzocchi made at 
Salahuddin’s behest.  Count 5 related to the $5,000 payment 
that Cooper made to Salahuddin shortly after being paid by 
Mazzocchi for subcontracted work. 
 Both Salahuddin and Cooper proceeded to trial, which 
began on September 7, 2011.  The Government introduced 
recorded conversations involving Salahuddin and Cooper 
made by Mazzocchi, documentary evidence of business 
records and records of charitable donations, and witness 
testimony from Mazzocchi and several Newark officials.  
After the Government rested, Salahuddin called several 
character witnesses and testified himself.  Cooper called no 
witnesses, but did examine Salahuddin.  On October 14, 
2011, the jury found Salahuddin and Cooper guilty on Count 
1 – conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official 
right in violation of the Hobbs Act – and not guilty on the 
remaining counts. 
 Near the close of the Government’s case, Salahuddin 
and Cooper moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  The District Court deferred 
ruling on the motion until after trial.  In post-trial briefing, 
they reasserted their claims under Rule 29, requested a new 
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trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, and 
challenged the verdict for insufficient jury instructions, 
selective prosecution, and outrageous government conduct.  
On July 19, 2012, the District Court denied the post-trial 
motions.   
 On February 11, 2013, the District Court sentenced 
Salahuddin to a term of imprisonment of one year and one 
day and two years of supervised release, and imposed a 
$5,000 fine.  On March 4, 2013, the District Court sentenced 
Cooper to a two-year term of supervised release, but no time 
in prison, and imposed a fine of $3,000.  Salahuddin and 
Cooper filed separate and timely notices of appeal 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 
III. 
 Because Salahuddin and Cooper briefed their appeals 
separately and raise different issues, we will address them 
separately.  We will address the challenges that Salahuddin 
raises to his conviction in Part III.A.  We will address the 
challenges Cooper makes to his conviction in Part III.B.  We 
note that Salahuddin joins all of Cooper’s arguments, but 
Cooper has not done the same. 
A.  Salahuddin 
 Salahuddin raises seven issues on appeal.  Three of 
those issues implicate his theory that an overt act is required 
for a Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction, and we address them 
together in Part III.A.1.  In Part III.A.2, we address 
Salahuddin’s argument that the Hobbs Act conspiracy 
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conviction required proof that a member of the conspiracy 
obtained benefits.  We then address Salahuddin’s argument 
that the conspiracy conviction cannot be sustained based upon 
Mazzocchi’s charitable contributions in Part III.A.3.  Finally, 
we address two issues challenging the jury instructions in Part 
III.A.4. 
 Salahuddin did not object to the jury instructions, and, 
with the exception of the argument that we address in Part 
III.A.2, he did not raise any of the arguments that he makes in 
this appeal before the District Court.  Therefore, we review 
his arguments (except his argument that the Hobbs Act 
conspiracy conviction required proof that a member of the 
conspiracy obtained benefits) for plain error.  In reviewing for 
plain error, we inquire whether there is “(1) an error; (2) that 
is plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”  United 
States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005).  An error 
is plain “if the error is ‘obvious’ or ‘clear under current law.’”  
United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 
(1993)).  If all three of these conditions are met, “an appellate 
court may in its discretion grant relief, but only if ‘the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
[the] judicial proceedings.’”  Dobson, 419 F.3d at 236 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Haywood, 
363 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
1. 
 Salahuddin raises three issues that can be grouped 
together as a challenge to the Government’s failure to prove 
that one of the alleged co-conspirators committed an overt act 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.  He argues that the District 
Court erred in omitting an overt act requirement from its jury 
instructions and that the rule of lenity requires that his 
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conviction be vacated.  He also contends that because the 
indictment alleged overt acts, the Government’s failure to 
prove these acts constructively amended the indictment.  
Because Salahuddin failed to object to the jury instructions or 
raise the constructive amendment issue before the District 
Court, we review these arguments for plain error.  See United 
States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 352 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying 
plain error review to an unpreserved constructive amendment 
issue); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 
2011) (applying plain error review to an unpreserved 
statutory interpretation issue); United States v. W. Indies 
Transport, Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying 
plain error review to an unpreserved jury instruction issue).   
 To address Salahuddin’s specific arguments, we must 
first determine whether an overt act is a required element of 
Hobbs Act conspiracy.  Our Court has not yet ruled on this 
issue.  We look to the Supreme Court’s opinions in United 
States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), and Whitfield v. United 
States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005), as the appropriate framework to 
use in making this determination.  Both cases applied 
principles of statutory construction to conclude that an overt 
act was not required under the relevant conspiracy statutes, as 
the statutory language was silent as to an overt act.  In 
Shabani, the Supreme Court considered the drug conspiracy 
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846.  513 U.S. at 11.  In Whitfield, the 
Court addressed conspiracy to commit money laundering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  543 U.S. at 211.   
 In prior cases involving conspiracy provisions, the 
Whitfield Court observed, “where Congress had omitted from 
the relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly 
requiring an overt act, the Court would not read such a 
requirement into the statute.”  Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 213; see 
also Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340 (1945) 
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(concluding that the Selective Service Act does not require an 
overt act for the conspiracy offense); Nash v. United States, 
229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (concluding that the Sherman Act 
does not require an overt act for antitrust conspiracy liability).  
Absent an indication otherwise, we presume that “Congress 
intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory 
terms,” and the common law understanding of conspiracy 
does not require an overt act for liability.  Shabani, 513 U.S. 
at 13.  The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which 
“preceded and presumably provided the framework” for later 
conspiracy statutes, expressly includes an overt-act 
requirement.  Id. at 14.  With this in mind, the Whitfield Court 
distilled the following rule:  if a statutory text is modeled on 
§ 371, the general conspiracy statute, “it gets an overt-act 
requirement,” but if it is modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1, which omits any express overt-act requirement, 
“it dispenses with such a requirement.”  Id. at 14 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Sassi , 966 
F.2d 283, 284 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 Salahuddin contends that Whitfield does not apply 
because its principle can only be invoked when the statutory 
text is plain and unambiguous, and the Hobbs Act, he 
maintains, is not.  But the Supreme Court did not establish 
that a statute must be plain and unambiguous as a 
precondition to the application of its test in Whitfield; instead, 
it merely rejected petitioners’ invitation to look at the 
statute’s legislative history because the statute was plain and 
unambiguous.  Id. at 215.  More importantly, Whitfield is only 
the last in a line of Supreme Court decisions applying the 
principle that when a conspiracy statute is silent as to whether 
an overt act is required, there is no such requirement.  
Previous cases did not make a determination that a statute is 
plain and unambiguous a prerequisite to the application of the 
 13 
principles of these cases.  Furthermore, the conspiracy 
provision in § 1951 as it relates to an overt-act requirement is 
plain and unambiguous.  The portions of the Hobbs Act that 
have been characterized as less than clear were distinct from 
the conspiracy provision at issue here.  See United States v. 
Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The scope of the 
term ‘under color of official right’ is not readily apparent 
from the face of the statute.”).  And finally, we have 
previously applied Whitfield to another conspiracy statute to 
determine whether it required an overt act, without first 
inquiring whether the statute was plain and unambiguous.  
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 160 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2009) (applying Whitfield to the Animal Enterprise Protection 
Act to conclude that the language of the statute did not 
require an overt act, even though the district court had 
required it in its charge on conspiracy). 
Applying Shabani and Whitfield here leads to the 
conclusion that Hobbs Act conspiracy under § 1951 does not 
require an overt act.  Section 1951(a) provides:   
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so 
to do, or commits or threatens physical violence 
to any person or property in furtherance of a 
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of 
this section shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  This language is similar to the statutory 
language for conspiracy to commit money laundering – the 
crime at issue in Whitfield – which provides that “[a]ny 
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person who conspires to commit any offense defined in 
[§§ 1956 or 1957] shall be subject to the same penalties . . . .”  
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  Neither mentions anything about an 
overt act, unlike § 371, which provides for conviction of 
conspiracy “[i]f two or more persons conspire [] to commit 
any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of 
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . 
. . .”  18 U.S.C. § 371 (emphasis added).  Conspiracy under 
the Hobbs Act, like § 1956(h) but unlike § 371, makes no 
mention of a required act.  Therefore we decline to read in an 
overt-act requirement. 
 Salahuddin urges that language in two decisions by 
this Circuit supports the  
conclusion that an overt act is required.  In Manzo, 636 F.3d 
at 68, and United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 
1982), both addressing Hobbs Act conspiracy, we mentioned 
“the principle that ‘[a]ll that was necessary, in addition to an 
overt act, was that the intended future conduct they had 
agreed upon include[d] all the elements of the substantive 
crime.’”  Manzo, 636 F.3d at 68 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 593).  This language originates 
from a case out of the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Rose, 
590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1978), which dealt not with 
Hobbs Act conspiracy, but with burglary conspiracy.  We, 
perhaps carelessly, allowed this language to creep in through 
a citation to Rose in the context of considering issues wholly 
unrelated to whether an overt act is required for Hobbs Act 
conspiracy.  The statements in these cases regarding an overt 
act were dicta, as they did not consider the issue of whether 
an overt act is required for Hobbs Act conspiracy, discuss it at 
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any length, or hold that it was required.2  Therefore, Manzo 
and Jannotti did not hold and do not establish that an overt 
act is required for Hobbs Act conspiracy in this Circuit.   
 Several of our sister Circuits have already weighed in 
on whether an overt act is required for Hobbs Act conspiracy.  
Today, we join the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, 
which have held that an overt act is not a required element of 
Hobbs Act conspiracy.3  See United States v. Monserrate-
Valentin, 729 F.3d 31, 62 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[A] Hobbs Act 
conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act.  Therefore, 
the district court did not err in declining to include the overt 
acts listed in the indictment as part of its instructions.”); 
United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(relying upon Shabani to conclude that “the government is 
not required to allege and prove an overt act in a prosecution 
for conspiracy to obstruct commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
                                            
2 This Court has defined dictum as “a statement in a 
judicial opinion that could have been deleted without 
seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding 
– that, being peripheral, may not have received the full and 
careful consideration of the court that uttered it.”  In re 
McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986)).  Whether 
an overt act was required for Hobbs Act conspiracy was not at 
issue in either case, so the statements could easily have been 
deleted from both without impairing their holdings.  
  
3 We note that the Fourth Circuit has recently indicated 
that proof of an overt act is not required for a Hobbs Act 
conspiracy.  See United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 409 
n.12 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 16 
§ 1951”); United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 480 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (“In order to establish a Hobbs Act conspiracy, the 
government does not have to prove any overt act.”).  The 
Fifth Circuit requires an overt act for Hobbs Act conspiracy.4  
See United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1995).  
However, the Fifth Circuit has not examined the overt-act 
requirement under the principles set forth in Shabani and 
Whitfield.   
 We conclude that proof of an overt act is not required 
for conviction of Hobbs Act conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a).  Therefore, the District Court did not err, let alone 
plainly err, in leaving such a requirement out of the jury 
instructions.  We also decline Salahuddin’s request to apply 
the rule of lenity.  The rule of lenity applies when “there is a 
‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.’”  
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) 
                                            
4 Salahuddin maintains that the Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits also require an overt act for Hobbs Act 
conspiracy.  However, the cases upon which he relies do not 
actually decide the issue.  See United States v. Corson, 579 
F.3d 804, 810 n. † (7th Cir. 2009) (observing the circuit split 
on the overt act requirement but declining to consider 
“whether proof of an overt act was required in this case” 
because the defendants did not appeal on that ground); United 
States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(observing that an overt act is required, but in a case dealing 
with money laundering conspiracy, not Hobbs Act 
conspiracy); United States v. Uselton, 974 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 
1992) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (observing, 
in a case raising a double jeopardy challenge only, that the 
indictment count for Hobbs Act conspiracy included overt 
acts). 
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(quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n.17 
(1994)).  It “applies only if, after seizing everything from 
which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess 
as to what Congress intended.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted).  Applying the principles set forth in 
Shabani and Whitfield, the language of the statute plainly 
indicates that an overt act is not required for Hobbs Act 
conspiracy.  Therefore, this is not an occasion to apply the 
rule of lenity. 
 Finally, we address Salahuddin’s contention that the 
failure to require proof of an overt act in the jury instructions 
constructively amended the indictment.  He maintains that 
Count 1 of the indictment listed several “objects” of the 
conspiracy, and by dispensing with the Government’s need to 
prove the overt acts allegedly charged as “objects,” he was 
convicted on an alternate or expanded basis from that charged 
in the indictment.  “An indictment is constructively amended 
when evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury 
instructions effectively ‘amend[s] the indictment by 
broadening the possible bases for conviction from that which 
appeared in the indictment.’”  United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Even 
assuming that these “objects” listed in the indictment were 
alleged overt acts – which the Government disputes – because 
we hold that proof of an overt act is not required for a Hobbs 
Act conspiracy conviction, the indictment was not 
constructively amended.  The Government was not required 
to prove and the jury was not required to find that any overt 
acts occurred, so the failure to prove the alleged acts in the 
indictment did not “broaden[] the possible bases for 
conviction from that which appeared in the indictment.”  
McKee, 506 F.3d at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Because we hold that the statute imposes no overt act 
requirement for a Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction, we reject 
Salahuddin’s arguments resting upon the theory that proof of 
an overt act was required for his conviction. 
2. 
 Salahuddin contends that for a valid Hobbs Act 
conspiracy conviction, the jury must find that the defendant 
obtained something of value from the victim, which is a 
requirement of extortion.  Because he was acquitted of the 
substantive bribery charges, which alleged several things of 
value that he extorted under color of official right, he argues 
that the jury necessarily found that he did not obtain anything 
of value and his conviction for conspiracy cannot stand.  We 
exercise plenary review.  United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 
260, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Salahuddin’s argument misunderstands the 
requirements for inchoate offenses.  He claims that because 
elements of the substantive offense were lacking, the inchoate 
offense of conspiracy must necessarily be lacking also.  But 
the substantive and inchoate offenses are separate crimes 
requiring different proof.  “Traditionally the law has 
considered conspiracy and the completed substantive offense 
to be separate crimes.”  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 
770, 777 (1975).  “Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the 
essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”  
Id.  “Because an agreement between two or more persons to 
commit criminal acts poses, in and of itself, a serious danger 
to social order, it is proscribed by the law of conspiracy.”  
Jannotti¸ 673 F.2d at 591.  The goal of the conspiracy – here, 
obtaining something of value under color of official right – 
need not be achieved for a conspiracy conviction.  “The 
ultimate failure of the conspiracy may diminish, but does not 
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eliminate, the threat it poses to social order; therefore, the 
illegality of the agreement does not depend on the 
achievement of its ends.”  Id. 
 Salahuddin relies upon our opinion in Manzo in 
support of his argument,5 but that case cannot be read to 
support the contention that proof that the defendant 
successfully obtained benefits is required for a Hobbs Act 
conspiracy conviction.  In Manzo, we considered whether 
                                            
5 Salahuddin also relies upon the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003).  In Scheidler, the Supreme Court 
held that “[b]ecause petitioners did not obtain or attempt to 
obtain respondents’ property,” there could be no basis for 
Hobbs Act extortion claims, state extortion claims, or claims 
of conspiring or attempting to extort.  Id. at 410.   Scheidler 
focused on the nature of the claimed property rights in finding 
no extortion.  The respondents maintained that the petitioners 
sought to obtain “a woman’s right to seek medical services 
from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses or other clinic 
staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to 
provide medical services free from wrongful threats, violence, 
coercion and fear.”  Id. at 400-01.  The Court concluded that 
although the petitioners may have deprived the respondents of 
these property rights, they did not acquire the property, 
because the nature of the property rights rendered them 
incapable of being “obtained,” which was necessary to 
commit extortion under the Hobbs Act.  Id. at 405.  The 
claimed property rights here –business, charitable 
contributions, and money – are of a very different nature than 
those claimed in Scheidler.  They are capable of being 
acquired and therefore do not present the same problems as 
the property rights at issue in Scheidler.  
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acting “under color of official right” was a required element 
of the inchoate Hobbs Act extortion offenses.  636 F.3d at 59.  
We concluded that acting “under color of official right” was 
required even for the inchoate offenses because it is a 
necessary status element of any Hobbs Act violation that does 
not involve threatened force, violence or fear.  Id. at 66-67.  
We acknowledged that “the government need not prove every 
substantive element of an offense to establish an inchoate 
offense,” id. at 66, but “[a] Hobbs Act inchoate offense 
prohibits a person acting ‘under color of official right’ from 
attempting or conspiring to use his or her public office in 
exchange for payments,” id. at 68-69.  “To sustain an ‘under 
color of official right’ Hobbs Act charge [where defendants 
were not public officials or holding themselves out as such] 
would create a legal alchemy with the power to transform any 
gap in the facts into a cohesive extortion charge . . . .”  Id. at 
69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Key to the determination that the government was 
required to prove “under color of official right” for inchoate 
Hobbs Act offenses was the conclusion that it was a “status 
element.”  Proving that a defendant successfully obtained 
benefits is not a status element.  Obtaining benefits is the 
desired outcome, object, or goal of the extortion.  Indeed, 
successfully obtaining benefits in many instances completes 
the extortion.  We observed in Manzo that “a Hobbs Act 
conspiracy charge does not even require that ‘the ends of the 
conspiracy were from the very inception of the agreement 
objectively [] attainable.’”  Id. at 66 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 
1998)).  If it is not even required that the ends of the 
conspiracy be attainable, it is surely not required that they 
actually be achieved.   
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 Requiring the government to prove that Salahuddin 
successfully obtained benefits would go much further than 
what is required under conspiracy law.  It is the illegal 
agreement that is criminalized in Hobbs Act conspiracy; the 
actual completion of the agreed-upon venture is immaterial.  
We therefore reject Salahuddin’s contention that the jury was 
required to find that he obtained benefits and that the acquittal 
on the substantive extortion counts undermines his conspiracy 
conviction.6 
3. 
 Salahuddin raises two issues with his conviction’s 
foundation upon Mazzocchi’s charitable and political 
contributions to Newark Now, Empower Newark, and then-
Mayor Booker.  He argues first that the Government was 
required to allege in the indictment that these entities were 
“acting in concert” with Salahuddin. Second, he argues that 
the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that for 
the conviction to be based upon charitable contributions – to 
                                            
6 Salahuddin argues that the acquittals on the 
substantive extortion counts result in a “legal insufficiency” 
or lack of requisite “crystallization” of criminal intent for 
Hobbs Act conspiracy.  Salahuddin Br., at 36 & n.10.  But 
bribery – of which he was acquitted – and Hobbs Act 
conspiracy have different elements and are charged under 
different statutes.  Even if the verdicts were inconsistent, we 
could not review them, as the Supreme Court made 
inconsistent verdicts “unreviewable.”  United States v. 
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984).  A defendant cannot 
“challenge an inconsistent verdict involving a conviction of a 
conspiracy and an acquittal on a predicate act.”  United States 
v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 264 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Newark Now and Empower Newark – it must find that there 
was an explicit quid pro quo agreement.   
 Salahuddin failed to preserve these issues below.  
“[I]ndictments which are tardily challenged are liberally 
constructed in favor of validity.”  United States v. Vitillo, 490 
F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 
1259 (3d Cir. 1979)).  We will uphold the indictment “unless 
it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable 
construction, charge an offense” under the relevant criminal 
statute.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 720 (D.C. Cir. 
1995)).  We review Salahuddin’s objections to the jury 
instructions issued by the District Court for plain error.  
Dobson, 419 F.3d at 236.   
 With respect to his first argument, Salahuddin relies 
primarily upon the Third Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions.  They provide:  “The government may show that 
the benefit was meant to be given to the public official 
directly, or to a third party who is not a public official but 
who was acting in concert with the public official.”  3d Cir. 
Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.18.1951-6 (emphasis added).  The 
District Court charged the jury using this exact language, 
including the “acting in concert” requirement.  See JA 2985.  
While it is far from clear that our case law imposes an “acting 
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in concert” requirement, to the extent that there is, the jury 
instructions complied.7 
 While the indictment does not use the specific “acting 
in concert” language, it can be fairly read to imply that 
Salahuddin acted in concert with the Newark officials raising 
funds for these charities.  The indictment stated that as a part 
of the conspiracy, “Salahuddin solicited and accepted 
contributions to organizations supported by City of Newark 
officials from [Mazzocchi], which defendant Salahuddin 
claimed would further enable him to secure demolition work 
and other valuable benefits for [Mazzocchi] and [his] 
company.”  JA 6-7.  Challenged at this tardy stage and on 
review for plain error, we cannot say that the indictment’s 
language is “so defective that it does not, by any reasonable 
construction, charge” that Salahuddin was “acting in concert” 
with the charitable organizations receiving Mazzocchi’s 
donations.  
                                            
7 Although the model jury instruction includes this 
language, the Third Circuit cases cited in the comment do not 
address an “acting in concert” situation, as they involved 
direct payments.  See United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 
(3d Cir. 2001) (declining to apply an explicit quid pro quo 
requirement in a case that involved direct payments to the 
official); United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
1999) (declining to apply an explicit quid pro quo 
requirement in a case involving direct payments to the public 
official and his defendant-girlfriend, without discussion of 
“acting in concert”).  Insofar as we need not – and do not – 
decide this issue of an “acting in concert” requirement to 
dispose of Salahuddin’s appeal, our opinion here should not 
be read as holding that there is an “acting in concert” 
requirement when the benefit is given to a third party. 
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 Salahuddin argues second that the jury was required to 
find an explicit quid pro quo arrangement for the charitable 
contributions sought from Mazzocchi, and the District Court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury as such.8  We have 
previously rejected attempts to require an explicit quid pro 
quo arrangement outside of the campaign contribution 
context.  See Bradley, 173 F.3d at 232 (approving an 
instruction without an explicit quid pro quo requirement 
because “a conclusion that in a Hobbs Act case the 
government has to demonstrate that the public official made 
an express promise to perform a particular act and that 
‘knowing winks and nods’ are not sufficient would frustrate 
the act’s effect” (quoting United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 
255, 274 (1992))).  As neither the Supreme Court nor this 
Court requires an explicit quid pro quo for non-campaign 
charitable contributions – such as those to Empower Newark 
and Newark NOW – the District Court cannot have plainly 
erred in failing to instruct the jury as such.9    
                                            
8 He also argues that his conviction cannot stand 
because he did not receive any benefits from the charitable 
contributions.  But as discussed in Part III.A.2 above, 
successfully obtaining benefits is not required for a Hobbs 
Act conspiracy conviction. 
 
 9 An explicit quid pro quo is required for extortion 
based upon campaign contributions.  McCormick v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991). The District Court did 
instruct the jury that in the context of political contributions: 
 
[I]f a particular defendant as a public official 
solicits, receives, obtains, or accepts a political 
contribution knowing that it is given in 
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 The District Court instructed the jury as follows:  
“[T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the public official knowingly and willfully, as those 
terms are defined later in these instructions, used his official 
position in order to obtain something of value to which he had 
no right.”  JA 2985.  Under the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Evans, “the Government need only show that a public official 
has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for official acts.”  504 
U.S. at 268.  As the jury instructions followed this precedent, 
the District Court did not plainly err. 
4. 
 Salahuddin raises issues with two other aspects of the 
jury instructions.  He argues that the District Court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide 
which one of the “objects” of the conspiracy the defendants 
agreed to pursue.  He also argues that the District Court erred 
in failing adequately to define “extortion under color of 
official right” in the jury instructions on Hobbs Act 
conspiracy.  As Salahuddin failed to object to the jury 
instructions before the District Court or submit an instruction 
                                                                                                  
exchange for an explicit promise or 
understanding by the official to perform or not 
to perform a specific official act or course of 
official action, then that defendant has 
committed extortion under color of official right 
and bribery.   
 
JA 2987-88.  This instruction complies with the applicable 
precedent with respect to Mazzocchi’s contribution to a 
fundraiser for then-Mayor Booker. 
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of his own, we review these claims for plain error.  Dobson, 
419 F.3d at 236. 
 With respect to the unanimity instruction, Salahuddin 
maintains that the District Court ought to have augmented – 
sua sponte – the general unanimity instruction to ensure that 
the jury understood that it must unanimously agree to facts 
supporting at least one object of the conspiracy.  The 
“objects” of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, were 
to obtain money and benefits, including demolition business 
and contributions, through Salahuddin’s position.  These 
“objects” are simply the benefits that the conspirators sought 
to obtain through their agreement.   
 Salahuddin looks to our decision in United States v. 
Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987), in support of his 
contention.  In Beros, we determined that the general 
unanimity instruction did not suffice where the defendant had 
been charged in the indictment with numerous acts, each of 
which could constitute a violation of the relevant statute.  Id. 
at 461.  Because in theory, twelve jurors could have agreed 
that the defendant violated the statute but with each juror 
predicating his or her conclusion upon different acts, the 
jurors ought to have been instructed that they must 
unanimously agree as to which specific act or acts supported 
his guilt.  Id. at 461-62. 
 Beros is distinguishable from Salahuddin’s case for 
several reasons.  First of all, there is a difference between the 
multiple alleged acts which could each constitute an offense 
in Beros, and the multiple alleged benefits which the 
defendants allegedly sought to obtain through the conspiracy 
here.  Because the specific benefits that the members of the 
conspiracy sought to obtain is not a required element of 
Hobbs Act conspiracy, the jury need not have been 
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specifically instructed as to unanimity in this regard.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he jury was not required to unanimously agree on the 
type of weapon that [the defendant] possessed, because a 
specific type of firearm is not an element of a violation under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).”).  Conspiracy seeks to punish only 
the act of agreeing to commit an offense, so the jury verdict 
only needs to be unanimous as to that act, not as to the 
multiple benefits that the defendants allegedly sought to 
obtain by entering into the agreement.  See Shabani, 513 U.S. 
at 16 (“[T]he criminal agreement itself is the actus reus . . . 
.”).  Beros is further distinguishable because the defendant in 
Beros had preserved the issue of the unanimity instruction in 
the district court below, whereas here, we are conducting 
plain error review.  Beros, 833 F.2d at 463.  We conclude that 
the District Court did not err, let alone plainly err, in failing to 
issue a specific unanimity instruction sua sponte.  
 Turning to the District Court’s jury instructions on the 
meaning of the substantive Hobbs Act offense, Salahuddin 
asserts that the District Court erred by failing to define 
“extortion under color of official right” in the instructions as 
to the Hobbs Act conspiracy offense.  The District Court 
instructed the jury that for the Hobbs Act conspiracy count: 
The government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that two or more persons 
knowingly and intentionally arrived at a mutual 
understanding or agreement, either spoken or 
unspoken, to work together to achieve the 
overall objective of the conspiracy, in sum, to 
obtain payments and other valuable benefits by 
extortion under color of official right, as I will 
describe for you later in these instructions. 
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JA 2976-77 (emphasis added).  Moments later, in recounting 
the instructions on the Hobbs Act attempt charge, the District 
Court further instructed: 
Extortion under color of official right means 
that a public official induced, obtained, 
accepted, or agreed to accept a payment or 
valuable benefit to which he was not entitled 
knowing that the payment or valuable payment 
accepted or to be accepted was made in return 
for taking, withholding, or influencing official 
acts. 
 
JA 2984-85.  This instruction tracks the Third Circuit’s 
Model Criminal Jury instructions and adequately defines the 
relevant terms under the governing case law.  See United 
States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In order 
to prove Hobbs Act extortion ‘under color of official right,’ 
‘the Government need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for official acts.’” 
(quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268)).  The few moments of 
delay before the jury was fully and properly instructed on the 
meaning of “extortion under color of official right” do not 
constitute plain error. 
B.  Cooper 
 Cooper raises four issues on appeal.  We address in 
Part III.B.1 Cooper’s argument that the jury’s guilty verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence.  In Part III.B.2, we 
address his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Finally, we address his contention that the District Court 
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erred in denying his motion to vacate his conviction and 
dismiss the indictment on account of the Government’s 
alleged selective prosecution and outrageous conduct in Part 
III.B.3.   
1. 
 Cooper contends that the jury’s guilty verdict as to the 
Hobbs Act conspiracy charge is against the weight of the 
evidence.  He first made the arguments supporting this 
contention before the District Court in a motion for a new 
trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.  Under this 
rule, the district court “may vacate any judgment and grant a 
new trial if the interest of justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 33(a).  “A district court can order a new trial on the ground 
that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence 
only if it ‘believes that there is a serious danger that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred – that is, that an innocent 
person has been convicted.’”  United States v. Johnson, 302 
F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Santos, 
20 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)).  “Thus, ‘[m]otions for a 
new trial based on the weight of the evidence are not favored.  
Such motions are to be granted sparingly and only in 
exceptional cases.’” United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 
189 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Gov’t of V. 
I. v. Derricks, 819 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987)).  When 
evaluating a Rule 33 motion, the district court “does not view 
the evidence favorably to the Government, but instead 
exercises its own judgment in assessing the Government’s 
case.”  Johnson, 302 F.3d at 150.   
 The District Court denied Cooper’s Rule 33 motion 
after thoroughly examining his arguments and the evidence 
supporting the conspiracy conviction.  The District Court 
concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s finding and 
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many of Cooper’s arguments were more properly made to a 
jury.  We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion 
for abuse of discretion.  Brennan, 326 F.3d at 189.   
 Cooper’s arguments that the jury’s verdict was against 
the weight of the evidence can be categorized into two 
groups:  (1) challenges to Mazzocchi’s trial testimony as 
biased, false, and contradictory; (2) alleged failures in the 
Government’s evidence presented at trial that undermine the 
jury’s verdict.  The District Court carefully evaluated all of 
Cooper’s contentions, which he repeats on appeal.  We have 
reviewed the evidence presented at trial alongside Cooper’s 
arguments, and conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Cooper’s motion. 
 The majority of Cooper’s arguments amount to 
challenges to Mazzocchi’s credibility and motives.  He argues 
that Mazzocchi gave false and inconsistent testimony and 
manufactured the conspiracy as reflected in the recordings.  
We can entirely reject these arguments, as the jury was made 
aware – through cross-examination, closing arguments, and 
the jury instructions10 – of Mazzocchi’s motivations, potential 
                                            
10 The District Court instructed the jury:   
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bias, and inconsistent testimony.  Equipped with this 
knowledge, it was the jury’s responsibility to decide whether 
or not to believe Mazzocchi’s testimony.    
 In suggesting that Mazzocchi’s testimony could not be 
believed, and therefore the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence, Cooper points to numerous alleged 
                                                                                                  
Cooperating witness testimony was received in 
evidence and may be considered by you.  The 
government is permitted to present the 
testimony of someone who has received a 
promise from the government that he will not be 
prosecuted and who has received a promise 
from the government that his testimony will not 
be used against him in a criminal case, but you 
should consider that witness’ testimony with 
great care and caution.  In evaluating his 
testimony, you should consider this factor along 
with the others I have called to your attention.  
Whether or not Mr. Mazzocchi’s testimony may 
have been influenced by the government’s 
promises is for you to determine.  You may 
give his testimony such weight as you think it 
deserves. 
 
JA 3014-15. 
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inconsistencies in Mazzocchi’s testimony.11  But many of 
these claimed inconsistencies are minor or more ambiguous 
than Cooper makes them out to be.  Mazzocchi’s testimony 
described numerous meetings, conversations, and transactions 
between himself and the defendants, it was lengthy, and it 
was subject to cross-examination by counsel for both 
Salahuddin and Cooper.  Some minor contradiction or 
confusion is understandable.  Even if the inconsistencies were 
more glaring than they appear to be, “[a] jury is free to 
believe part of a witness’ testimony and disbelieve another 
part of it.”  United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 189 (3d Cir. 
2002).  It was the jury’s responsibility to weigh Mazzocchi’s 
credibility considering his entire testimony, including the 
alleged inconsistencies. 
 Contrary to Cooper’s arguments, Mazzocchi’s 
testimony was not the Government’s only evidence of the 
conspiracy.  Much of the evidence against Cooper and 
Salahuddin came from their own mouths, through recorded 
conversations.  Therefore, any inconsistencies and credibility 
issues with Mazzocchi’s testimony do not render the jury 
verdict against the weight of the evidence. 
 The remainder of Cooper’s arguments implicate 
isolated pieces of evidence presented at trial, which he 
                                            
11 For example, Cooper observes that Mazzocchi first 
testified that Salahuddin introduced him to Cooper.  He then 
admitted that was not the case, he had been introduced to 
Cooper by Parlavecchio.  Cooper also contends that 
Mazzocchi contradicted himself by first acknowledging that 
he wished to gain access to business Cooper obtained through 
minority set-aside contracts but then stating that the plan the 
whole time was to use Salahuddin’s influence to obtain 
business. 
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believes undermine the Government’s proof of the elements 
of the conspiracy.  Through these arguments, Cooper asks us 
to look one-sidedly at small, isolated portions of the record to 
conclude that the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence.  But when each instance he raises is placed in the 
proper context, it becomes clear that ample evidence – albeit 
sometimes circumstantial – supported the conspiracy. 
 To the extent that Cooper challenges the lack of direct 
evidence against him, that argument fails.  While there may 
not have been direct evidence of a quid pro quo, the evidence 
of bribery and the unlawful nature of their agreement could 
be proven circumstantially.  McKee, 506 F.3d at 238 (“[A] 
conspiratorial agreement can be proven circumstantially 
based upon reasonable inferences drawn from actions and 
statements of the conspirators or from the circumstances 
surrounding the scheme.”). 
 Cooper suggests that Mazzocchi’s admission that he 
paid Cooper a fair price for legitimate work that was 
completed undermines the jury’s finding of a conspiracy.  But 
as the District Court observed, “[t]he issue is not how much 
Cooper was paid for his work, but how he received the work 
in the first place.”  United States v. Salahuddin, No. 10-104, 
2012 WL 2952436, at *14 (D.N.J. July 19, 2012).  Similarly, 
Cooper suggests that his ambivalence about whether 
Mazzocchi paid him with cash or a check and his lack of 
effort to conceal the $5,000 payment he made to Salahuddin 
show that he did not have the intent to commit extortion.  The 
jury was free to make this inference; however, there was 
ample evidence indicating that Cooper wished to join the 
conspiracy and conceal other aspects of his relationship with 
Salahuddin.  For instance, Cooper stated of Salahuddin, “he’s 
a political guy so he can’t get involved” in Mazzocchi’s 
subcontracting work to Cooper.  SA 172.  And while Cooper 
 34 
argues that their relationship merely indicated that they were 
close friends, the jury was free to credit circumstantial 
evidence indicating a concealed business relationship instead.   
 Cooper contends that Salahuddin’s openness in his 
attempts to push Mazzocchi for city demolition contracts 
demonstrates a lack of illicit purpose.   But the jury could 
infer that because Salahuddin did not have any actual 
authority over demolition contracts, he had to use 
Mazzocchi’s name in urging those who controlled the process 
to award them to Mazzocchi.  The illicit purpose is supported 
by Salahuddin’s failure to reveal Mazzocchi’s arrangement to 
subcontract work to Cooper and his own connection to 
Cooper.   
 Cooper argues that the conspiracy conviction is 
undermined because Salahuddin told Mazzocchi that he did 
not need to subcontract work on one particular job to Cooper, 
stating that Mazzocchi could “do something for him” if he 
could, but if he could not “on this one, don’t worry about it.”  
SA 303.  But the jury could also construe this conversation, 
along with the discussions of the other work the defendants 
and Mazzocchi hoped to obtain, as showing that their 
relationship was an ongoing one.  It could conclude that 
Mazzocchi did not need to subcontract to Cooper on this 
smaller job because there were bigger ones coming down the 
pipeline.   
 Ultimately, the arguments that Cooper makes do not 
come close to suggesting “that there is a serious danger that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred.”  Johnson, 302 F.3d at 
150 (internal quotation marks omitted).  His arguments about 
credibility and challenges to portions of the Government’s 
evidence were made to the jury, who were free to reject them.  
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
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discretion in rejecting Cooper’s arguments that the jury’s 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and denying 
his motion for a new trial. 
2. 
 Cooper argues next that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  He maintains that there was 
insufficient evidence presented to the jury to allow them to 
find that the Government had sustained its burden of proving 
each element of the alleged conspiracy.  The District Court 
denied Cooper’s motion.   
 “We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
grant or denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on 
the sufficiency of the evidence, applying the same standard as 
the district court.”  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 
206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We “review the record in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any 
rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond 
a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.”  United 
States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 294 
F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “The burden on a defendant 
who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
extremely high.”  Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206 (internal quotation 
marks omitted ) (quoting United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 
150, 155 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 In support of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, 
Cooper incorporates all of the arguments and contentions 
made in his challenge to the weight of the evidence, discussed 
above.  We need not revisit these arguments at length.  To the 
extent that they challenge Mazzocchi’s credibility, the jury 
knew of his potential bias and the inconsistencies in his 
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testimony, yet still a rational trier of fact could have credited 
his testimony.  And while isolated pieces of evidence could 
support a not guilty verdict, copious recorded testimony 
supports the jury’s verdict.  For the same reasons discussed 
above, these arguments cannot lead us to conclude that no 
rational trier of fact could have found Cooper guilty of 
conspiracy to extort under color of official right. 
 Cooper also argues that the inconsistency of the jury’s 
not guilty verdict on the Hobbs Act attempt charge with the 
guilty verdict on the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge should be 
considered in evaluating the sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
claim.  He maintains that it was impossible for a rational jury 
to determine that Cooper conspired to commit extortion under 
color of official right, but did not attempt to do so.  The 
acquittal, he argues, shows that the jury determined that he 
either lacked the intent to commit extortion or that he did not 
take a substantial step in furtherance of the conspiracy, either 
of which would undermine the conspiracy conviction.   
 This argument misunderstands the requirements of 
attempt as compared to conspiracy.  An attempt conviction 
requires that the defendants acted with the requisite intent to 
violate the Hobbs Act and performed an act that constituted a 
substantial step towards the commission of the crime.  Manzo, 
636 F.3d at 66.  The jury did not inquire whether Cooper 
performed a substantial step in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
because conspiracy and attempt are different crimes.  The two 
inchoate offenses address different conduct, and “along the 
continuum of different criminal activity, attempt crimes are 
closer to completed crimes than are conspiracy crimes.”  
United States v. O’Brien, 972 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1992).  As 
discussed above, Hobbs Act conspiracy does not even require 
an overt act.  A rational jury could have reasonably concluded 
that Cooper entered an agreement intending to commit 
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extortion under color of official right, but took no substantial 
step in furtherance of committing that crime.   
 Furthermore, the jury’s acquittal on the attempt count 
is irrelevant to our review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
on the conspiracy count.  Review to determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence to convict on a particular count 
“should be independent of the jury’s determination that 
evidence on another count was insufficient.”  Powell, 469 
U.S. at 67.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict for the reasons discussed above and 
in the District Court’s lengthy opinion.  The District Court did 
not err in denying Cooper’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  
3. 
 Cooper argues that the District Court erred in denying 
his motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the indictment 
on account of selective prosecution and outrageous 
government conduct.  We conclude – as the Government 
urges – that these claims are waived due to Cooper’s failure 
to raise them before trial. 
 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “a 
motion alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution” must 
be raised before trial.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A).  Claims 
of selective prosecution and outrageous government conduct 
allege defects in the institution of the prosecution.  See United 
States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
defense of outrageous government conduct is based on an 
alleged defect in the institution of the prosecution itself.”); 
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(“The question of discriminatory prosecution relates not to 
the guilt or innocence of the appellants, but rather addresses 
itself to a constitutional defect in the institution of the 
prosecution.”).  We have observed that a pretrial motion is 
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necessary to a claim of outrageous government prosecution 
“unless the evidence supporting the claim of outrageous 
government conduct is not known to the defendant prior to 
trial.”  Pitt, 193 F.3d at 760.  The same logic applies to a 
claim for selective prosecution.  Therefore, we hold that 
claims of outrageous government conduct and selective 
prosecution must be made in a pretrial motion, unless the 
evidence supporting these claims were not known to the 
defendant prior to trial.  
 Cooper raised neither the selective prosecution claim 
nor the outrageous government conduct claim before trial.  
Instead, he raised them in a post-trial motion.  Cooper has 
presented no explanation or excuse for his failure to present 
these arguments prior to trial.  He had sufficient opportunity 
to do so, as the evidence upon which he now relies in support 
of these claims was available to him well before trial.12  We 
conclude that Cooper waived these defenses by failing to 
raise them in a pretrial motion as required under Rule 
                                            
12 Cooper bases his selective prosecution and 
outrageous government conduct claims on the Government’s 
alleged relinquishment of prosecutorial authority and agency 
to Mazzocchi.  Cooper contends that Mazzocchi is racist, and 
chose to focus the investigation upon Cooper and Salahuddin 
due to his racial animus.  But Cooper was aware that the 
Government chose to prosecute only Salahuddin and himself 
– both African-American – and not Mazzocchi and 
Parlavecchio – both Caucasian – from the time of institution 
of the proceedings against him.  He relies upon transcripts of 
taped conversations between Mazzocchi and Parlavecchio to 
demonstrate Mazzocchi’s alleged racial animus, but these 
recordings were made available to him almost a year before 
trial began. 
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12(b)(3)(A).  Because he has given no explanation or excuse 
for his failure to raise them previously, we need not make an 
exception to Cooper’s waiver.  See Pitt, 193 F.3d at 760 
(refusing to grant an exception to a waiver finding because 
defendant had offered no explanation for failure to raise the 
defense in a pretrial motion). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgments of conviction for both Salahuddin and 
Cooper.  
